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Reconstructing Self-Determination: The Role
of Critical Theory in the Positivist
International Law Paradigm
BY EDIBERTO ROMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the third annual LatCrit conference's panel on Race,
Nation, and Identity: Indigenous Peoples and LatCrit Theory. As mod-
erator of this panel, I will undertake two tasks. First, I will introduce the
panelists and provide a few words concerning a common theme that this
illustrious group will address. This theme revolves around the role that
critical race theory may have on, what I will, call self-determination
movements. In addition to making these introductory remarks, I will
follow the theoretical framework of this conference by undertaking an
innovative critical analysis of another common thread that weaves
through all of these discussions, namely, the acceptance of the liberal
international law doctrine of self-determination. In particular, I will cri-
tique the purportedly universal norm of self-determination in order to
expose and explain its inherent subjectivity and the incoherence that
results from its arbitrary nature. I will undertake this task by assessing
the positive legal paradigm that exists for addressing international law.
In addition to pointing out the flaws of the paradigm, I will engage in a
deconstruction of the right of self-determination. I will conclude with a
brief reconstruction of this right.
As the title of this panel suggests, our topic of discussion is the
intersection of subordinate groups movements in the global arena and
the role that critical race theory plays in such movements. The first
presenter is Taygab Muhmud, Professor of Law at Cleveland Marshall
College of Law. In his piece, "Lessons from South Asia's Post-Colonial
Experience," Professor Muhmud will address the role that race and
racial constructions have played in South Asia's self-determination
movement. By referring to the colonial debate in India, Professor
Muhmud argues that one cannot address adequately any modern concep-
tualization of the meaning of race without appreciating the role Euro-
pean Colonialism has played in such construction.'
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University, B.A. 1985, Lehman College, J.D.
1988, University of Wisconsin. This essay is dedicated in loving memory to Carmen Hernandez.
Much thanks goes to Erik Nelson for his invaluable research assistance.
1. Professor Muhmud and I are apparently kindred spirits when it comes to this subject. My
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The Second presenter is Siegfried Weissner, a valued colleague and
Professor of Law at my institution, Saint Thomas University. Professor
Weissner's scholarship and teaching focuses on international law. He
will address the resurgence of indigenous communities in the interna-
tional law context. Professor Weissner has been committed to this area
for several years, as demonstrated by his work in St. Thomas Univer-
sity's annual symposia concerning indigenous people. After briefly
reviewing the development and available applications of LatCrit theory,
Professor Weissner will use his five intellectual tasks technique for
problem solving to highlight the efforts, successes, and shortcomings of
indigenous people in obtaining self-determination.
The third presenter is Julie Mertus, a visiting Associate Professor at
Emory Law School, where Professor Mertus also serves as a Fellow in
religion and law. Her presentation is -a critical comparison of Eastern
Europe and Latin America.2 Professor Mertus, using what she terms the
"rhetoric of primordialism", the "rhetoric of complexity", and the "rhet-
oric of simplicity", will compare how race and its various constructions
are deployed in the United States and in Eastern Europe.
The last speaker will be Donna Coker, a Professor at the University
of Miami School of Law. Professor Coker will provide a provocative
critique of the presentations that has been made at today's conference.
I. SELF DETERMINATION DEFINED
Whether discussing the movements of indigenous people, the neo-
colonial plight of the people of South Asia, or a comparative analysis of
Eastern Europeans, this panel is addressing what traditional parlance
describes as a people's quest for greater autonomy and for a separate
state. 3  In other words, we are describing various forms of self-
determination.4
Self determination is recognized as "the right of a people or a
nation to determine freely by themselves without outside pressure to
pursue their political and legal status as a separate entity."5 The princi-
forthcoming article entitled, "The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S.
Colonialism," similarly calls for recognition of the role that colonialism has played in U.S. racial
stratification.
2. This comparison serves as the foundation of Professor Mertus' forthcoming book,
NATIONAL TRUTHS: THE BUILDING OF SERBIAN NATIONALISM.
3. See generally Paul H. Brietzke, Self Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion:
Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 WIs. INT'L. L.J. 69 (1995).
4. See generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION I
(2d ed. 1992).
5. Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42
VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1128 n.44 (1998) (citing Kimminich in an article that examines the principle
of self-determination with reference to the dominion of the United States over the people of Puerto
[Vol. 53:943
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pie of self-determination is dichotomous. It is boldly radical and pro-
gressive, yet it is also deeply subversive.6  The principle as such has
egalitarian underpinnings and is theoretically universal in its intended
applicability and scope.7 "perhaps no contemporary norm of interna-
tional law has been so vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the
right of all peoples to self-determination."8 Self determination is
grounded on human rights precepts that recognize that all peoples are
"equally entitled to be in control of their own destinies". Self determi-
nation is based on principles of human freedom and equality. As such, it
is at odds with colonial rule or similar forms of foreign domination.9
Following World War I, self-determination became a principle of
international law.1 ° It was considered essential to the maintenance of
world order and peace.t President Woodrow Wilson was the catalyst in
the early development of self determination. During the period when
Wilson was promoting the creation of the League of Nations, he
declared, "No peace can last or ought to last, which does not recognize
and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers
from the consent of the governed and that no right anywhere exists to
hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were prop-
Rico); Otto Kimminich, A "Federal" Right to Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 85 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (quoting Frank Przetacznik, The Basic
Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a Prerequisite for
Peace: Its Philosophical Background and Practical Application, 691 REVUE DE DROIT INT'L DE
SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUES 263 (1991)); see also Lung-Chu Chen, Self-
Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 n.5 (1991)(identifying
challenges facing self-determination under international law); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging
Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 52 (1992)("Self-Determination
postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory to determine its collective
political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of democratic entitlement.");
Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301, 321 n. 111
(1995) (discussing Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)); Fredric
L. Kirgis, Jr., Self-Determination of Peoples and Polities, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 369, 369-
70 (1992)(discussing self-determination in the context of international law); Lisa Cami Oshiro,
Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination , 25 N.M. L. REv. 65, 65-66 (1995)
(noting indigenous peoples under dominion and control of the United States must turn to
international law for the source of their right to self-determination because the U.S. Constitution
does not include such right).
6. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 1, 5 (1995).
7. See James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law:
Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 22 GA. L. REV. 309, 314-19 (1994).
8. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (1990).
9. See Anaya, supra note 7, at 320.
10. See Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current
International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 24 (1992).
11. See Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.
153, 167 (1994).
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erty."' 2 In 1918 he asserted, "Self-determination is not a mere phrase.
It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth
ignore at their peril."13
After this period, self determination gained further acceptance as
reflected by its incorporation into the United Nations Charter. Specifi-
cally, the first article of the Charter provides that one of the purposes of
the United Nations is "[tlo develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinations
of peoples. .. 14 This point is reaffirmed in the Charter's article on
economic and social cooperation and human rights. 5
In addition to the Charter, various General Assembly resolutions
adopted shortly thereafter invoked the principle of self determination
and further explained its importance and applicability. 6 Resolution
545, adopted in 1952, particularly stands out. It recognized "the right of
peoples and nations to self-determination as a fundamental human
right."' 7 This evolution of self determination from a principle to a funda-
mental right led to the adoption, in 1960, of the Declaration of the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.' 8 This
declaration "[s]olemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy
and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations".
It adds that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of
that right they. . . . freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."' 9 In 1970, the General Assembly adopted the Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations2 ° with respect to self-determination. This
declaration, which is arguably the most authoritative explication on the
right to self-determination, 2' provides:
The use of force to deprive people of their national identities consti-
tutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-
intervention. . .By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples enshrined in the charter of the United
12. Roman, supra note 5, at 1126.
13. Speech of Woodrow Wilson (February 11, 1918), reprinted in I The Public Paper of
Woodrow Wilson: War & Race 180 (R. Baker & Dodd eds. 1927).
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 2.
15. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
16. See Roman, supra note 5, at 1132-33.
17. G.A. Res. 545, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2219 (1952).
18. See G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 66, UN Doc. A/4884
(1960).
19. Id. In 1966, self-determination was made part of the two International covenants on
human-rights, which the General Assembly approved with only some reservations on the part of a
few Western states. See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1993).
20. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Sup.p. No.28, at 121, UN Doc. A/2517
(1970).
21. C.F. Koldner, supra note 11, at 155.
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Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without exter-
nal influence, their political status and to pursue their economic,
social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the charter.
Every state has the duty to promote .... realization of the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
(a) to promote friendly relations and cooperation among states; and
(b) to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind
that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitations constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a deni-
al of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the charter .... 22
In addition to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions,
decisions of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) further endorsed
the principle of self-determination. In its advisory opinion on the status
of Nambia,23 as well as in its later opinion on Western Sahara, 4 the
I.C.J. opined that self-determination was more than a guiding principle
to be heeded and promoted by the United Nations. It was a right that
could be invoked by its holders to claim separate statehood and sover-
eign independence.26
As a result of this widespread endorsement by President Woodrow
Wilson and the United Nations, self-determination became to many
international law scholars "the pre-emptory norm of international law." 27
Indeed, self-determination has become "accepted and recognized by the
international community of States... as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character. '28
II. A CRITIQUE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
After reading the papers of this conference's presentors and dis-
cussing related topics with them before and during this panel, a question
arose that troubled me so much that it provoked me to offer the follow-
ing critique of public international law. This conference and the panel
are to examine issues related to race, identity, and indigenous peoples.
We are to approach problems in this area with a critical, post-modern,
22. G.A. Res., supra note 20.
23. International Court of Justice Reports 1971, at 16,3 1.
24. International Court of Justice Reports 1975, at 12, 31-33.
25. See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 2 (1993).
26. See id.
27. Cass, supra note 10, at 27.
28. Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 699.
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eye towards finding innovative solutions to various anti-subordination
projects. 9 When examining problems related to self-determination
movements, however, we continue to work within the traditional liberal
paradigm, which utilizes the same methodology, nomenclature, and con-
ceptualization of our traditional, doctrinal, and formalistic counterparts.
In theory, self-determination is intended to bestow upon all peoples
the right to determine their future. At this point, practice intersects with
theory, and a problem arises. A failure arises because of the inherent
shortcomings of a positivist formulation. The positivist does nothing
more than state what the law is, rather than state what it should be. With
this as the dominant paradigm, it is often impossible to discern whether
a law is effective because the formulation is merely descriptive.
Nevertheless, most international law scholars admittedly have taken
a positivist theoretical formulation or approach.3° One writer addressing
legal positivism in general explains:
Now the legal positivist is not necessarily taking the so-called bad
man's view of the law, namely, that people would only obey the law
because they fear the punishment which would be visited upon them
if they were found violating the law. For most of the time, most obey
the law because they regard the law to rest upon moral order and to
derive its legitimation from it. 3
Another writer aptly argues:
Any elaborate doctrinal edifice built upon a legal positivism is mis-
leading. One does not have to be a legal realist or a crit to realize that
the positivist attempt rigidly to segregate "law" from "politics"
misses the essence of self-determination, and of much else in interna-
tional law.32
This dominant liberal tradition in international law has been
described as accepting "that which is fundamental [because it has been]
agreed to be fundamental".33 This formulation also has been referred to
as the pure theory of law, 34 its sole purported purpose being to know
29. See generally Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Religion, Gender, Sexuality,
Race and Class In Coalitional Theory: A Critical And Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social
Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503 (1998)(by engaging in analysis from the most
vulnerable perspective, critical theory facilitates scholarly examination of the sources, workings,
and effects of power by focusing on the sectors of society where power is wielded with most
license and impunity).
30. See Gerry J. Simpson, Is International Law Fair?, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 615, 616 (1995).
31. KEEKOK LEE, THE POSITIVIST SCIENCE OF LAW 187 (1989).
32. Brietzke, supra note 3, at 101-02.
33. ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1986).
34. See generally KELSEN, THEORIE GENERALE Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES
COURS 121 (1932).
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its subject.35 It answers. . . "what law is, [and] not what it ought to
be".3 6 In other, words, the traditional and prevalent discourse use circu-
lar logic to conclude that international law scholars accept the authority
or power of international law because it has been made law. Paul
Brietzke poignantly described the dilemma when he noted, "The bland
positivist assumption of a sovereign statehood ignores the contemporary
upheavals and transformations that will not stay swept under some 'stat-
ist rug.' International 'persons' will often behave schizophrenically over
self-determination because of the divergent interests of the humans and
the groups compromising them.37"
Possibly in light of the criticisms of the stayed acknowledgments of
positivist formalism, a new wave of critiques of liberal theory arose
from a group of writers who have been categorized as "new stream"
scholars.38 Influenced by critical legal studies, this new group has
attempted to shift the forms of international legal scholarship from anal-
ysis of doctrine to acceptance of the determinative quality of culture and
policy.39
Taking from this new stream, I will attempt to provide a swell or at
least a ripple in this theoretical waterway. I argue that the traditional
positivist paradigm is nothing more than a formalistic social construc-
tion that has been designed by international scholars. The traditional
paradigm essentially reaffirms the normative values of the law that have
been written by international scholars. Because, historically, these inter-
national scholars have not questioned what the law should be, their fail-
ure to question the underpinnings and normative values of their doctrinal
formulations renders their laws to be limited, incoherent, anachronistic,
and apologistic attempts to be objective in spite of historical
occurrences.
If, as a positivist international law scholar, one does not question
the moral value of the law in application, as traditional international
scholars have done, is not the law merely a value free, after-the-fact
attempt to categorize actions of states? If principles of law or rights
such as self-determination, which is premised on the appreciation of
35. See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Independence, 55 HARV. L.
REv. 44 (1941).
36. Id. at 44; see also MARIO JORI, LEGAL PosrTIvlSM, Part I (1992) (distinguishing
positivism from naturalism); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Law as Order, 91 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1978)
(positivist posits merely what law is).
37. Brietzke, supra note 3, at 102.
38. See generally Carty, supra note 33, at 1; MARTri KOSKENNIEM, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); David Kennedy, A New
Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIs. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1988).
39. See Simpson, supra note 30, at 1.
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human rights, are selectively applied, then, even to the positivist, the law
may not be law but mere politics.
According to Hans Kelsen, the pure theory of law, seeks the real
and the possible, not the just. 4° Indeed, it declines to justify or con-
demn.41 This theory or formulation in the international law context is
troubling when one considers some of the goals of public international
law. International law and self-determination, in particular, seek to
establish an order of human dignity.42 As such, they appear to aspire to
attain some sort of world justice.
Despite this attempt, traditional international law scholars refuse to
critique the efficacy of that law. Accordingly, these scholars never will
objectively determine whether the noble goals of international law are
ever achieved. For instance, while self-determination, as addressed ear-
lier, is purportedly uniformly applicable to all peoples, precedent dem-
onstrates that the right is anything but uniformly applied.
According to some, self determination is not capable of any objec-
tive application. Hurst Hannum argues that the European Community
Arbitration Commission has engaged in a "fruitless search for definition
of 'self,' 'determination,' 'peoples,' and related terms that have never
proved capable of providing reasoned criteria for international action. 43
Some even have argued that self-determination is not law but is nothing
more than "nonsense."' 4 Brietzke opines that "[a]s a description of what
a vague international community believes, or believes it believes, this
right lacks many concrete correlative duties."45  The subjectivity in
which the right of self determination has been invoked leads to the argu-
ment that such a universal principles can be used as nothing more than a
means to apologize or as an attempt at post-hoc rationalization for power
politics, economic politics, and racial politics. A historical review of the
purported application of self-determination illustrates this point.
III. DECONSTRUCTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
By examining the twentieth century development of the right of
self-determination and highlighting selected case studies of its applica-
40. Kelsen, supra note 35, at 44-45.
41. See id.
42. BuRNs H. WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 683-84 (2d ed.
1990) ("The principle of self-determination in its modem conception also appears as a principle of
legitimacy underlying and inspiring the evolution of international law").
43. Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old Wines in New Bottles?,
3 TRANSAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 69 (1993).
44. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7
WIs. Ir'L L.J. 51, 60 (1988) (quoting Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a former member of the
International Court of Justice).
45. Brietzke, supra note 3, at 85.
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tion, I will illustrate, history's failure to apply this universal right to all
peoples. Rather than blindly accepting the basic tenets of term self-
determination without questioning its efficacy, I will address the three
dominant trends of self-determination: 1) the era of geopolitical milita-
rism, 2) the era of racial tutelage, and 3) the era of global disinterest.
While to some extent aspects of these dominant trends will overlap,
I believe that each of these three periods describe modes of thought that
prevailed when forms of self-determination were implemented periodi-
cally in the twentieth century. In each of these dominant trends, either
racial subjugation or Eurocentric messianic self-image has been a con-
siderable undercurrent.
These trends, therefore, demonstrate that the so-called "right" of
self determination, which is purportedly universal in terms of its
intended beneficiaries, has never been applied universally. Under-
represented minorities who have not had the backing of any world
power primarily were passed over by this "right".
From as early as 1917, Woodrow Wilson declared, "No power can
last or ought to last which does not recognize and accept the principle
that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples [from] sov-
ereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."46  One writer
described this dynamic political concept as containing philosophical
roots which penetrate the deepest layers of human history and tribal con-
sciousness. 47 Another writer has stated, "The proposition that every peo-
ple should freely determine its own political status and freely pursue its
economic, social, and cultural development has long been one of which
poets have sung and for which patriots have been ready to lay down
their lives."'48 Notwithstanding these ubiquitous proclamations, self-
determination has been unevenly and unevenhandidly applied since its
onset.
A. The Era of Geopolitical Militarism
During the period when President Woodrow Wilson first was
championing the principle of self-determination the world was at war.
Consequently, "[t]he success or failure of assertions of minority rights
for self-determination in the late nineteenth century depended [not so
much on the virtuous nature of the principle but] to a great extent on
46. W. OFUATEY-KODGOE, THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
21 (1977)(summarizing the origins of the principle).
47. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 154 (1990).
48. John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 193 (Theodor Merson ed., 1984).
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external support from one or more of the [World] Powers".4 9 Hurst Han-
num points out that "[i]n most instances, winners and losers [to claims
of self-determination were determined] more by the political calcula-
tions and perceived needs of the Great Powers than on the basis of
which peoples had the strongest claims to self-determination." 5
Thomas Franck describes the early application of the principle as imper-
fect.51 "More important, it was not made generally applicable but was
confined almost entirely to the territories of the defeated powers. Few
post [World War I] claims of self-determination were made against
states that had not been on the losing side in the War."'52 For example,
The brooding and unpredictable menace of Bolshevism persuaded the
Allies... to create bastions of the West in Eastern Europe, necessar-
ily at the expense of smaller nationalities. As the much-trumpeted
principle of national self-determination conjured up an impossible
nationalist dream, so the compromises deemed necessary by Allied
perceptions of practicality and strategy made disillusionment among
the minorities all the keener. 53
In his book on self-determination, Antonio Cassese similarly notes
that, after World War I, most of the Allies claimed that the primary
purpose of their war effort was the realization of the principle of nation-
ality and of the right of people to decide their own destiny. 4 Despite
this avowed purpose, when it came to actually applying the principle os
self-determination this right was subordinated to other concerns in order
to make "the peace treaties with the vanquished."5 For instance, the
Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which was signed between Germany and
the Allies, conferred territories to the newly created states of Poland and
Czechoslovakia without consulting with the populations that occupied
the new countries.5 ' Likewise, the peace treaty of 1919 with Austria
conferred Tyrol Alto Adige to Italy without consulting with the native
inhabitants of that territory. Other allocations of defeated territories
were provided for in the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly. Once again, the
49. HANNUM, supra note 8, at 28.
50. Id.
51. FRANCK, supra note 47, at 159.
52. Id.
53. RAYMOND PEARSON, NATIONAL MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 1848-1945 at 196
(1983). Antonio Cassese, in his book entitled SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, (1995)
determined that the discriminatory application of the principle dates back to the French revolution
whereby French leaders used the principle to justify the annexation of lands belonging to other
Sovereigns. See CASSESE, supra note 6, at 11-12. This enabled France to assert that Alsace was
French and no longer belonged to Germany in 1790.
54. CASSESE, supra note 6, at 23-24.
55. Id. at 24.
56. The Treaty of Versailles, June 23, 1919.
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inhabitants of these lands were never asked if they wanted to become
citizens of a new country.
At the onset of its modern-day conceptualization, self-determina-
tion was the clarion call for worldwide conflict. Ultimately, the princi-
ple proved to be of little importance when the interest of a people who
would otherwise have the right to assert it was inconsistent with the
Western powers' political agenda. Thus, from the beginning of this cen-
tury and through the mid-twentieth century, the conceptualizations of
self-determination wa a right that was subject to Western geopolitical
omnipotence. This was the era of self-determination as defined by geo-
political militarism.
B. The Era of Racial Tutelage
Professor Ruth Gordon, who has written extensively on the of trus-
teeship, advances a critical race perspective to the debate of self-deter-
mination.57 She points out that, after World War I, the self-
determination became applicable to certain Europeans.58 For non-
Europeans, however, "any semblance of self-determination was embod-
ied in the League of Nations Mandate System."59 Article 22 of the
League of Nations Covenant called for advanced guardians over certain
colonies and territories that were deemed to be incapable of self-rule.6 °
Like Professor Gordon, Thomas Franck notes, "[i]f self-determina-
tion was imperfectly applied in Europe... it was applied hardly at all to
Europe's overseas colonies."'" Under this Eurocentric paternalistic
framework, self-determination was essentially unavailable for the "less-
advanced" people of the third world. Instead, these people were
entrusted to the tutelage of "Advanced Nations. 62  These nations,
which were comprised of Europeans or decedents of Europeans,
believed themselves to be responsible for the well-being and develop-
ment of their charges, and they carried out their responsibility as a
"sacred trust of civilization."63
As a result of World War I, German and Turkish possessions were
transferred to Australia, Belgium, Britain, France, Japan, New Zealand,
and South Africa under the Mandate System's sacred trust principle.64
57. Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems With Trusteeship, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301, 317
(1995)(addressing the discriminatory application of the principle).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, para. 2.
61. FRANCK, supra note 47, at 160.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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Franck argues that, as a result of these acquisitions, the victors of the
war, ignored the principle of self-determination, and actually increased
the size of their overseas empires .6  They did this without making any
serious commitment to giving the people of the acquired territories con-
trol of their future.66
During the middle part of this century, self-determination again
became a driving force in international law debates. The Atlantic Char-
ter, an instrument used by England and the United States to promote the
end of World War II, reaffirmed a commitment to "respect the right of
all peoples to choose the form of government under which they wish to
live."67
Although he had committed his nation to this agreement, Winston
Churchill made it clear that England's economic and political interests
would not be undermined. In 1941, the very same year the Atlantic
Charter was drafted, Churchill informed the House of Commons that the
principle proclaimed in the Charter did not apply to colonial peoples,
especially those who reside in India, Burma, and other parts of the Brit-
ish Empire.68
The League of Nations and the Atlantic Charter eventually gave
way to the United Nations Charter, which specifically adopted the prin-
ciple of self-determination. 69 Despite this reaffirmation of the right, the
U.N. Charter retained vestiges of the subordinating paternalistic mandate
system through its implementation of the Trusteeship System.7" Chap-
ters XI of the U.N. and XII established that self-determination for non-
self-governing and trust territories was to "proceed at a pace dictated by
the colonial administrators."'" Article 73(b), called upon the signatories
"to develop self-government. . . according to the particular circum-
stances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement. ' 72 Article 76 likewise included a duty "to promote the...
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progres-
sive development towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peo-
ples."73  These demeaning and subordinating proclamations from self-
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See Roman, supra note 5, at 1130.
68. CASSESE, supra note 6, at 37 (quoting 374 PARL.DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 68-69 (1977).
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (enunciating purpose of the Charter to establish friendly
relations and economic cooperation between nations based on principles of equal rights and self-
determination); See id. art. 55 (same).
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 73, 75 (delineating the parameters of the Trusteeship System).
71. Simpson, supra note 30, at 265.
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(b).
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
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proclaimed advanced nations were embraced by the International Court
of Justice."4 In its advisory opinion on the status of Nambia, the court
recognized that the U.N. Charter embraced the principle of Sacred Trust
and extended it to all territories whose peoples had not yet attained full
self-government." As Gordon argues, for non-European peoples, Euro-
pean tutelage became a means of executing self-determination.76
Indeed, even the methodology of the trusteeship system, with terms such
as "advanced nations" and "sacred trust", was embedded with paternal-
ism over people of color, resembling the concept of Manifest Destiny.
Despite these shortcomings of self-determination, the global
acceptance of the right did have a considerable impact that eventually
caused a re-mapping of the world. For instance, the principle led to the
dismantling of much of Britain's empire and lead to the independence of
nearly one billion persons.77 These new countries, in turn, assisted in
the decolonization of the French, Dutch, Belgian, Spanish, and Portu-
guese empires.78 Thus, from the era of racial tutelage evolved the reali-
zation for millions of the right to self-determination. This success
partially was to the efforts of the third world to elevate the principle of
self-determination further on the United Nations agenda.
C. The Era of Western Disinterest and Localized Self-Interest
Not long after these substantial successes of the right of self-deter-
mination, a new era of inconsistency arose. During the period after
World War II, global militarism and racial tutelage digressed into an era
of Western laizze faire over the acts of the formerly colonized nations.
This inconsistency arose as a result of a more localized self-interest and
the failure of the world community to adequately support self-determi-
nation as an enforceable right.
Several examples of this incoherence exist. In these instances, the
world powers and the United Nations allowed the absorption of areas
within former colonial territories without ascertaining, in any meaning-
ful way, the wishes of the populations that were to be annexed. 79 The
case of India's post-independence conquests is a classic example of this
acquiescence.80 India used its military might to deny the right of self-
74. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 319.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Franck, supra note 47, at 161.
78. Id.
79. MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 20 (1982) (describing
these occurrences as violations of the territorial criterion of defining the "self").
80. Id. at 20.
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determination to Kashmir.8 Shortly thereafter, India seized Goa.8 2
Other examples of the disregard of the right of self-determination
include Indonesia's absorption of West Irian, 83 the annexation of the
Western Sahara by Morocco,84 and Indonesia's forceful incorporation of
East Timor as part of its territory.85 In describing these events, Yves
Beigbeder wrote, "If self-determination is an internationally recognized
principle, why does it not apply to the people of West Iran, East Timor,
Tibet, Kashmir and other territories as it has been applied to other colo-
nial territories."86
In these illustrative, but far from exhaustive examples, the self-
determination hardly was applied universally. In these cases, the world's
balance of power was not a dominant concern, racial tutelage did not
appear as the driving force, and Europe was not subjugating of third
world countries. Instead, third world people were dominating other third
world people, and the subjugated were aliens.
Perhaps self-determination was deemed irrelevant in this area,
because the subjugation was perpetrated by people of one color against
another. In many, if not all, of these examples, the world powers evi-
dently determined, as evidenced by their inaction, that the peoples who
had their lands annexed were not worthy of self-determination. In the
case of India's seizure of Goa, a Security Council resolution condemn-
ing India was blocked by a Soviet veto, and a majority of the General
Assembly apparently accepted India's position.87 Despite a sanction
levied by a split United Nations against Indonesia for its annexation of
West Irian, the occupation of the area by Indonesia occurred without any
further notable consequences.88 With respect to Western Sahara, differ-
ing worldwide opinions prevented effective condemnation. 89 Thus, this
era became marked by Western disinterest in self-determination and
localized political and economic self-interest.
III. RECONSTRUCTION
After critiquing the traditional positivist paradigm, I shall attempt
to reconstruct the right of self-determination. This effort seeks to pro-
81. See Clyde Eagleton, The Case of Hyderbad Before the Security Council, 44 AM. J.INT'L
L, 277 (1950).
82. Quincy Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 AM.J.INT'I L, 626 (1982).
83. CASSESE, supra note 6, at 78-79.
84. Id. at 76-78, 214-18.
85. Id. at 223-30.
86. YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA, AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 145 (1994).
87. POMERANCE, supra note 79, at 20.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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mote a more pragmatic theory that will address historical occurrences
and explain how the law ought to be. Key to any interpretive analysis is
an appreciation of the imprecision of interpreting the intended meaning
of words and accurately uncovering the intended goals of the legal
precepts and other postulates one is analyzing.
A. Self-Determination Redefined
In order to reconceptualize the principle of self-determination, one
must appreciate its intended goals. As eluded to earlier, self-determina-
tion essentially seeks to ensure that "people" have the right to choose
their own political, cultural, and economic future. This is consistent
with the spirit of democracy. Given this noble, yet terribly broad, aspi-
ration, the question should then turn to a critique of the principle's
intended scope.
Self-determination recently was described as a term that has a wide
penumbra of uncertainty.9" Nonetheless, a construction can be formu-
lated to address the intended framework that initially was proposed to
guide states. The first interpretive hurdle in defining self-determination
is defining "self'. This term answers the question, "Who can claim the
right to self-determination?" Recent scholarly debate concerning this
subject has centered around whether the right is recognized outside the
decolonization context.9" If the right, as some have argued, is limited to
the colonial or alien subjugation context, then thorny problems related to
secession and failed states are avoided.9" This position, however, may
be too anachronistic, and such a reading may defeat the very goals
behind self-determination movements. Moreover, a conservative read-
ing of the right, which would limit self-determination to the colonial
setting, lends itself to, and arguably promotes, a continuation of the
world powers' disinterest when one third world people denies the right
to another third world people.93
This would perpetuate the Era of Western Disinterest that is
described above. Additionally, accepting this limited formulation would
90. CASS, supra note 10, at 21.
91. See Michael Akehurst, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (5th ed.
1984); see also Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J.INT'L L. 1, 31 (1993); CASS,
supra note 10, at 23; Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting self-Determination as an International Law
Concept: A Major challenge in the post-cold war Era, ILSA J. INT'L & CoMp.L. REv. 443 (1997).
Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy and the Limits of
the Interwar Framework, 33 HARV. INT'L L. J. 353, 377 (1992); Nathaniel Berman, "But the
Alternative is Despair: 'Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1792, 1803 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 91, at 446.
93. POMERANCE, supra note 79, at 11.
19991
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
be inconsistent with the critical theory's anti-subordination project's
effort to champion the interest of the vulnerable or outsider.
A more controversial formulation of "self' grants the right of self-
determination to indigenous people and distinct minorities that reside in
significant number within an existing state.9 4 This formulation is con-
sistent with the humanitarian goals behind the right. For instance, sig-
nificant deprivations of human rights, such as those faced by the Kurds
in Iraq, may leave the Kurds with no alternative other than secession.95
Accordingly, with respect to the question of who can claim the
right of self-determination, a group claiming to be a "self' entitled to the
right should possess certain objective characteristics of a distinct group
as suggested by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
1541.96 Such characteristics include a common ethnicity, language, his-
tory, or other cultural distinctiveness.97 The group who claims to be a
"self" also must possess a subjective characteristic. 98 Its numbers must
share "elements of group identity . . . which give rise to a parochial
sentiment and which are thus likely to produce government based on
consent." In other words, the group must see themselves "as one people,
one community." 99 Pragmatic considerations must be accounted for in
order for a group to legitimately be considered a people. For instance, at
a minimum, the group must demonstrate that they are capable of becom-
ing economically viable and politically independent. Otherwise, they
will inevitably be destined to become wards of one or more existing
states.' 00 The more conventional formulation of "self' could deny the
right to a group that would otherwise meet all of the traditional charac-
teristics of a people. This could result in an aspiring "self' being told,
"You are not really a people, but merely a minority," or "You are not
really under 'colonial' or 'alien' rule at all." 10' 1
A word of caution concerning the controversial view of the term
"self' is necessary. Every state contains minority groups. If each group
within a state can claim the right to self-determination and succeed, self-
94. See generally Cass, supra note 10, at 25.
95. Nanda, supra note 91, at 445.
96. See generally G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/
4651 (1960) (the characteristics of inhabitants of defining a non-self-governing territory who may
be entitled to the fight as these who are ethnically or culturally distinct and live in an area that is
geographically separate).
97. Id.
98. See L. BUCHHEIT, Secession 229 (1978).
99. John Collins, Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W.
REs. J.INT'L L. 135, 150 (1980).
100. Id. at 150.
101. POMERANCE, supra note 79, at 12.
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destruction of virtually every state could result."°2 Thus, those who
claim self-determination within an existing state (i.e., a secession) must
demonstrate all of the above criteria. If such criteria is met then, consis-
tent with the role of the United Nations, such claims must be weighed
against potential threats to regional and world peace.
B. A Role for the United Nations in the Reconstruction Process
A workable and logical paradigm for the right of self-determination
that addresses precedence must be established. Regardless of which def-
inition of "self' is adopted, the global community must end the selective
recognition of the right to self-determination and acknowledge prece-
dence. The right should be recognized universally. As Brietzke points
out, the rules of self-determination should not be so regulated or quali-
fied by precedence so that exceptions become the rule. 03 If this were to
occur, then we would return to inconsistent application of the right.
Consistent with the democratic underpinnings of the right, demo-
cratic discourse should resolve the dispute over self-determination. In
order to achieve this goal, the global community, through the United
Nations, should place self-determination conferences high on its agenda.
The settings of these conferences should not be unlike that of the treaty
of Versailles, and they should be held every ten years. Rather than using
self-determination to reconfigure the borders of defeated territories,
these conferences should be used to address claims by groups asserting
the right.
When the detail of self-determination are finally, "ironed-out," the
right must be held sacred. Violations of the principle must be con-
demned; selective condemnation cannot be tolerated. The only way to
achieve this goal is to prevent political self-interest from carrying the
day at the conferences.
The existing structure of the United Nations provides a vehicle to
achieve these goals. The United Nations, however, must take a proac-
tive approach. The United Nations or one of its subsidiary organs, such
as the Security Council, should be responsible for the conferences and
should be empowered to hear any existing claims of self-determination.
Consistent with its goal to promote world peace, the United Nations
must be pragmatic and weigh claims of self-determination against any
real threats to world peace. Accordingly, the right must not be used as a
destabilizing force that can completely undermine notions of state sover-
eignty. Nevertheless, as the fifty-plus security council resolutions on
Yugoslavia demonstrate, actions by the United Nations must not end
102. See id. at 143.
103. Brietzke, supra note 3, at 20.
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with mere verbal condemnations. Indeed, one of the functions of the
United Nation's Security Council is to appoint subsidiary organs to
investigate any dispute or situation that may threaten world peace. l14
The Security Council's ability to conduct peace-keeping operations may
be an effective tool to meet this function.0 5 This tool may provide
"teeth" to the Council's proclamations. °6 For instance, as of June 1996,
the Security Council initiated forty-one United Nations peace-keeping
operations. 0 7 Twenty-six of these had been commenced since 1989.
As the conflicts in Croatia, Slovenia, and East Timor have taught us,
claims made by minority groups who consider themselves to be people
with a right to attain self-determination can lead to scenarios that
threaten world peace if their calls are not heeded. Thus, after studying
claims of self-determination, the council should recommend that the
entire General Assembly consider passing resolutions on each particular
claim. If the annexing foreign power or existing state refuses to recog-
nize a given resolution, the Security Council should be able to recom-
mend or implement economic sanctions and possibly use peace-keeping
forces as a threat of last resort. Some writers go as far as to argue that
"military might may be the true key for implementing and enforcing
self-determination claims."l0 8 Obviously, the peace-keeping or the use
of force avenue is one that actually can facilitate destabilizing world
order. Therefore, this option must be one of last resort. It should be
considered only: (1) after a prolonged period of economic sanctions,
coupled with failed diplomatic efforts that demonstrate human that rights
or regional peace are threatened, or (2) when there is a preexisting state
of armed conflict.
Without the United Nations' firm commitment to address existing
disputes and its resolve, to take the necessary action to settle the claims,
self-determination will remain a laudable goal with few, if any, means to
achieve its realization. In order to ensure that the process is as unbiased
and objective as possible, there should be no need for certain United
Nations Security Council members to maintain veto power. Such a
power can politicize the process, promote further inconsistent applica-
tion of the right, and thereby undermine the right. This proposal has
been my starting point for an evolutionary process that can reconstruct
the currently incoherent principle of self-determination.
104. SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL 353 (1798).
105. See Nanda, supra note 91, at 445 ("There is a growing recognition of the close link
between human rights and international peace and security").
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Collins, supra note 99, at 146.
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